National Observer No. 69 -Winter 2006

 

 

The United States and India

by Sharif Shuja

National Observer
(Council for the National Interest, Melbourne),
No. 69, Winter 2006,
pages 35–45.

 

When U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited India in March last year, she said: “This is my first step as Secretary of State in Asia. The President has personally put a lot of time and energy into the relationship. The U.S. has determined that this is going to be a very important relationship going forward and we are going to put whatever time we need into it.” The aim was to take U.S.-India ties “to another level”. According to her, the Bush Administration was sworn to assisting “India become a major world power in the twenty-first century”.

Rarely in the past hundred years has a U.S. president sent a signal of this dimension. It means that the U.S. will help India realise the global aspiration that its size, geography and its post-1991 economic reform agenda have made into a national obsession. The core judgement is that a strong, democratic and influential India is an asset for the U.S. in the region and the world.

At the annual Asia Security Summit, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore on 3 June, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said: “Our relationship with India has grown from an uneasy coexistence during the Cold War to a true partnership, based on our common values and common interests today.” 1 He continues, “Over the past five or six years, the relationship between the U.S. and India, from a military-to-military standpoint, has been on a steady improvement. And, it is multifaceted at this stage. It involves exercise. It involves working together on problems of common interest. And we certainly expect to see that our areas of common interest will continue to bring us together, from a military-to-military standpoint, in the months and years to come.” 2

Over the past few years, India and the United States have been getting on better than ever. Joint exercises have been conducted between U.S. and Indian forces near Agra, and the U.S has also indicated it will supply modern military equipment to India. The U.S. Ambassador to India, David C. Mulford, said in early April 2005 that the Bush Administration wants to advance Indo-U.S. strategic cooperation and has indicated that, as part of the “Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership” deal, New Delhi would be made a party to the “expanded dialogue on missile defence”. India, for its part, has decided to participate in joint naval exercises with the NATO forces in Alaska. India has something to hope for; it is aiming to be a major economic force and a key global power.

The global stature of India today as an emerging power is a result of its recent economic growth, its nuclear tests and capability, and its search for a greater role in the international system. The Lowy Institute August 2005 survey comparing India and China says a “democratic India that grows at 6 per cent a year should be congratulated for having succeeded better than a brutal anti-democratic China which grows at 10 per cent a year”. 3

Many Indians believe that India’s regional pre-eminence — in size, centrality, defence capability, substantial economic potential, and political stability — is a positive factor that would help consolidate future India-U.S. relations. 4

In fact, both parties’ interests are converging and supportive of each other.The United States wishes to gain free access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, which is possible only with Indian collaboration. The Indian Navy can be a handy instrument for policing the sea-lanes all the way from Saudi Arabia to Japan. America, therefore, feels that it is in its own interests to convert India into a powerful regional force, which suits India perfectly.

India is making desperate attempts to seek a close military and economic relationship with the United States to recover from the setback it received as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, her Cold War ally. This was evident from two episodes in 2001.

First, as soon as the Bush Administration declared it was developing a National Missile Defence, New Delhi rushed to be the first, anywhere in the world, to welcome its stand. Second, following the 9/11 terrorist attack, when the U.S. prepared to attack Afghanistan, the Vajpayee Government beat Pakistan to the draw in offering Indian military bases and facilities to the U.S. Though grateful, Washington declined since the offer would have been impractical, and Pakistan, being willing, was much more important an actor in neighbouring Afghanistan.

It is good to learn about the past. In the 1950s, the United States recruited Pakistan as an ally in its Cold War with the Soviet Union. But it also became a major aid donor to India. Indians remember how U.S. arms militarised South Asian politics, but they forget, or mostly do not know of, the massive U.S. assistance in modernising the Indian education system and triggering the green revolution in agriculture. In 1980, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan compelled the United States to revitalise its failing relations with Pakistan. But even while bolstering and using Pakistan to fight its war against the Russians, the United States did not ignore India. Washington declared itself ready to export some weapons systems to India and offered to ease Indian access to some kinds of high-tech equipment, especially computers.

So now, as U.S. forces operate out of Pakistani bases, the Americans ensure that New Delhi is kept happy by allowing Indian Navy offshore patrol vessels to escort American ships through the Strait of Malacca. Also, while the U.S. has approved sales of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, it also offered F-18 planes and state-of-the-art military industrial manufacturing know-how to India. The interesting point for India is that it will be making these aircraft under licence and, unlike Pakistan, will not be dependent on Washington for spare parts. The United States, as a truly great power, wants to be seen as being friendly to all South Asian countries, not just India or Pakistan.

According to Nicholas Burns, U.S. under-secretary of state for political affairs: “Growing US-India cooperation does not come at Pakistan’s expense. It’s very important, I think, to say again that we have this unique relationship with Pakistan, which is vital to our country in the war on terrorism.” 5

He continued: “We have another unique and vital relationship with India. And, as Secretary Rice has said many times before, there’s no reason to have a hyphenated strategic framework for South Asia. Both countries are important. And there are issues where U.S. policy intersects, and there are issues where we can have individual relationships with both countries.” 6

This bold move by the U.S. is widely regarded as part of attempts to foster India as a counterweight to China.

America’s tilt towards India was first witnessed during the Administration of the first George Bush in December 1990, with the visit of a sizeable American defence delegation. It was led by Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security, Henry Rowen, who held talks with his Indian counterpart. This was followed in August 1991 by the visit of an Indian delegation to the United States, led by General Sunil Francis Rodrigues, the Indian chief-of-staff. The prospect of closer military cooperation between India and America received a further boost in October 1991, when Admiral Charles Larson, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, visited India. Again, in January 1992, discussion in Delhi between Lt General John Crons, commanding general of the U.S. army in the Pacific, and Admiral Frank Kelso, chief of naval operations, and senior Indian military officers cleared the ground for a long-term “forces to forces” level relationship. In these exchanges, negotiations on a range of security areas, where both sides could cooperate for mutual benefit, were discussed and proposed.

To a significant degree, the strength of the relationship between India and the United States can be traced to the vigour of the relationship at the unofficial level. The migration of Indians to the United States, where many have become prominent in scientific, business and academic circles, has played an especially important role in the development of the relationship. These migrants retain close links with India. Many more receive their advanced education in the U.S. and then return to India. Such links are of considerable value in the development of India’s more sophisticated technologies. 7

The Indian community in the U.S. took the lead in the creation of a Friends of India Group in the U.S. Senate. This is a significant political event since it has become a powerful pressure group. Prominent politicians in the group include Republican Senator John Cornyn from Texas and Democrat Senator Hillary Clinton from New York.

At the official level, some influential Indian-Americans who are currently serving the Bush Administration are helpful in further strengthening the relationship. The number of Indians serving the current U.S. Administration in various capacities has steadily grown over the past year. 8 In other words, the message is that the Bush Administration has sought to engage India on the whole range of issues that currently confront the international community. No matter what the issue, be it counter-terrorism, national defence, international commerce or preventing HIV/AIDS, the President has looked to India as a partner. India needs U.S. support to become a key global power, and its closer diplomatic and military cooperation with the U.S. is, one hopes, going to serve the national security interests of both countries.

The most topical area of this cooperation is in military-to-military relations, and these offer an impressive illustration of the way in which Indo-U.S. ties are moving from the discussion stage to active cooperation. For example, near Agra, Indian paratroopers and American special operations forces participated in their largest-ever joint army and air exercises since India’s independence. The specific goal of the exercise was to conduct joint parachute training and mutual familiarisation with small arms. Even though this joint exercise is an important milestone, it is only an indicator of the impressive growth in military cooperation between India and the United States. The U.S. and Indian navies have also conducted exercises, and U.S. Navy ships have made several port visits to India. These indicate that Indian and U.S. military forces are now actively developing the capability to work together effectively. Such cooperative activity between military organisations is a normal aspect of relations between friendly countries.

The U.S. Defence Policy Group was also revived in December 2002. It provides the framework for the planning and coordination of American military relationships. Within that framework, other bodies, such as the executive steering groups for the army, navy and air force and functional working groups, have discussed technological, research and development cooperation, sales and licensing issues and peacekeeping operations. The defence supply relationship between Indian and American authorities has been notable in that it involves the private sector as well as government.

Clearly, the events of 9/11 changed the dynamics of U.S.-India defence relations. This was reflected in an interview with The Hindu on 3 May 2003 by the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, who once again emphasised the growing bilateral defence relationship, saying that India had been “very helpful in assisting with logistics and flights, and that what was significant was that this relationship was now astronomically different from what it had been a year ago”. He further said, “We love the idea of being able to call on occasion on Indian ports, naval ships … . We hope it will be good for U.S.-India relations.”

Regarding Indian military acquisitions from Russia, the U.S. attitude is that “India was a free country and as such it was free to acquire defence systems from any country”. India has maintained a pattern of dual supply: the bulk of the aircraft come from Russia, but the cutting-edge component is supplied from the West. Old Soviet equipment from Russia is still value-for-money in India. India continues to develop its nuclear arms programme with foreign assistance, mainly from Russia. It relies on foreign assistance for key missile technologies, where it still lacks engineering or production expertise. India also continues to modernise its armed forces through advanced conventional weapons, mostly from Russia. New Delhi received its first two MiG-21-93 fighter aircraft, and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd will now begin the licensed upgrading of 123 more aircraft.

Russia is the main supplier of technology and equipment. India concluded an $800 million contract with Russia for 310 T-905 main battle tanks, as well as a smaller contract for KA-31 helicopters. New Delhi is also negotiating with Russia for nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier, having also signed a $270 million contract with Israel for the Barak-1 missile defence systems. In addition, Russia has proposed selling the long-range S300V surface-to-air missile system to New Delhi. The offer was reportedly renewed during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in December 2002. This defensive shield is claimed to be capable of detecting and destroying aerial targets, including missiles from a long distance in all weather conditions, to protect vital installations.

The United States no longer views its relationship with India primarily through the prism of its relations with other countries in the region. Given the improvement in U.S.-Russian relations, the U.S. now appears to have no objections to Russia being India’s largest supplier of military hardware. In other words, the United States, finally, is acknowledging the legitimacy of India’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy. While there will be close politico-strategic-military ties between India and the U.S., there will be no “alliance” relationship.

India is interested in buying the Arrow Weapon System from Israel, which is being developed jointly by Israel and the U.S. to intercept short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. India considers itself an ideal candidate for the Arrow system, given the possibility of missile threats from both China and Pakistan. A missile defence system could help prevent either country from blackmailing India on the nuclear issue. Since Arrow is defensive in nature, Indian officials claim, it would be unlikely to change the strategic balance in the region.

One obvious function of the system would be to defend against Pakistan’s Ghauri and Shaheen missiles, which can be fitted with nuclear warheads. Although the Arrow is primarily a defensive system, it is also powerful enough to propel a 500-kilogram payload about 300 kilometres. Many South Asia analysts believe a decision to sell the Arrow to New Delhi would prompt Pakistan to boost its offensive capability to counter India’s defensive shield, or begin seeking ways to get its own version of missile defence.

India disputes the contention that the sale has anything to do with proliferation, repeating that the system is defensive, not offensive. This episode once more highlights the difficult path the U.S. faces as it attempts to deepen its relationship with India without upsetting Pakistan.

According to the Indian Express, the U.S. is offering India high-tech defence and space cooperation in terms of satellites and launch vehicles, Patriot and Arrow missiles, access to civilian nuclear technology and a greater role in global institutions. India’s aim is to generate 25 to 30 per cent of its huge energy needs from a nuclear source.

Paul Kelly, a senior journalist for The Australian, was quoted in The Weekend Australian (21-22 May 2005), saying: “The U.S. no longer narrowly defines India within the terms of its rivalry with Pakistan, and Bush accepts the reality of India as a nuclear power.”

In a joint statement issued by the U.S. and India on 19 May 2005, during the visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran to Washington, the two sides announced their desire “to promote democratic values and human rights globally through the United Nations, the Community of Democracies and other international forums”. Winston Lord, who accompanied Henry Kissinger on his 1971 trip to China, said: 9

“We paid greater attention to China for geopolitical reasons … despite the fact that China has a ruthless system and India was a democracy. But there is a limit to our relations with China because we share only interests, not values. The fundamental reason for India and the U.S. coming together is our shared values.”

As U.S. interests in India grow, the value addition would be a bonus. Bush’s thinking is shaped by the contrast between India’s democratic values and China’s authoritarianism. The U.S.’s underlying strategic view is that India is a second Asian giant — capitalist, multicultural, secular and democratic — which will exert a gravitational pull that must limit China’s aspiration to global hegemony. This is a recently-conceived U.S. position for the long-term, and it does not assume that India can overtake China.

India has huge military capacity, is a nuclear power and is committed to democracy, but to date its record on non-proliferation is poor. Although India has “weaponised” its nuclear capability, the U.S. has reconciled itself to India’s nuclear-weapons status coupled with its relatively strict nuclear export controls. Besides, India is a “strategic partner”, whom Washington wants to “help become a world power”.

In June last year, India and the U.S. signed a 10-year agreement to strengthen defence ties between the two countries. The landmark agreement will help facilitate joint weapons production, cooperation on missile defence, and the transfer of technology. The U.S. is also trying to push its defence wares into the lucrative Indian market. The decision by India’s national carrier, Air India, to place an order exclusively with the Boeing company has gone down well in Washington’s corridors of power. A marketing and media blitz is currently under way in an effort to convince New Delhi to opt for American F-18 aircraft for the Indian Air Force. It is noteworthy that India has been offered the F-18 — which the U.S. hasn’t sold even to its NATO allies. That’s not all. The U.S. is offering India “partnership” in manufacturing these weapons. And, most important of all, the U.S. is offering India a greater role in global institutions, while India is trying to get a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

The United States has struck a historic deal with India under which India will be permitted to acquire civilian nuclear technology internationally while retaining its nuclear aims. Though India will remain outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), U.S. officials say that the bilateral accord concluded by U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 19 July last year will “bring India close to treaty standards”. The agreement, if approved by the U.S. Congress, would mark a historical turning point, as it would end a major source of friction between the two countries — the ban on American nuclear technology sales to India.

Under the U.S.-Indian accord, India will be permitted to buy nuclear reactor fuel and components from the U.S. and other suppliers. But, in return, it will have to allow international inspections and safeguards of its civilian nuclear programme, and to refrain from any further nuclear weapons testing and transfer of arms technology to other countries.

The accord attracted immediate fire from some arms-control experts who said that India should not be given access to the civilian technology until it signed the NPT. Critics such as David Albright, a physicist and former UN weapons inspector, have begun attacking India’s nuclear non-proliferation record.

Senator Joe Biden, Democrat member on the Foreign Relations Committee, argued: 10

“The administration must show Congress it will make us more secure by bringing India into closer compliance with international non-proliferation norms, that it will not assist India’s nuclear weapons program in violation of the NPT, and that it will not cause other countries to question their commitment to non-proliferation because of a perceived double standard.”

The Bush Administration, however, is defending the accord. According to Nicholas Burns, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs: 11

“Obviously, it’s the wish of the United States that all countries will join the NPT. India has not made a decision to do that. So, we deal with the situation where a partner of ours, a friendly country, a very large country with significant energy needs, is willing now to commit itself to undertake all of the quite-invasive measures to safeguard its facilities. That is a benefit, not just for the United States; it’s a benefit for the non-proliferation community.”

Selig Harrison, senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and director of the Asia Program, had drafted an open letter to the U.S. Congress urging that it ratify the decision by the executive. Arguing that India was an ideal counterbalance to China, Harrison said, “Failure to implement [the White House’s decision] would be a body blow to the development of a strong relationship with India, [which is] so important to achieving U.S. goals in Asia and beyond.”

Condoleezza Rice joined the fray, stressing in a Washington Post piece the positive business spin-offs from the deal: “Our agreement”, she wrote, “is good for American jobs, because it opens the door to civilian nuclear trade. India plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012. If U.S. companies win just two of those reactor contracts, it will mean thousands of new jobs for American workers.”

While India’s nukes have broken no laws, in practice it got its start in the weapons business, rather as North Korea and Iran did, by misusing technologies and materials provided for civilian purposes. This could be regarded as cheating. Rule-bending for India is bound to encourage some other countries to rethink their nuclear options too. But less damage might have been done if the non-proliferation gains had been real ones. In particular, India should have been pressed to stop making fissile material as a condition of any bargain. Pakistan, already signalling interest, could have joined such a moratorium.

Meanwhile, in return for America’s bending the rules of nuclear trade, India will put more civilian nuclear reactors under international safeguards, and stiffen its anti-proliferation resolve.

India has two great attractions. One is stability. India has proven mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power and the ability to withstand terrible internal conflicts — in Kashmir and the northeast, for example — without danger to its integrity. Another attraction is demography. India will remain younger and dynamic well into the middle of the 21st century. So, for many reasons, a close partnership between India and America seems both desirable and inevitable.

President Bush is dealing with the world as it is, and wants democratic, friendly, law-abiding India to be treated as an exception by the U.S. Congress. The Bush Administration is trying to convince Congress to endorse this historic deal. However, Congress can veto Bush’s nuclear agreement with India.

India’s political elite and some strategic experts debate how far India should enter the U.S. embrace. They point out that the interests of the U.S. and India differ on foreign policy issues. For instance, India has a major stake in a multi-polar world, which is balanced and orderly, not dominated by only one major state. The U.S. would like the opposite.

One Indian critic, strategic analyst Praful Bidwai, said: “Today’s India is driven by chauvinist nationalism. It seeks recognition as a great power — but is callous towards its people, a majority of them poor and victims of centuries of injustice and discrimination.” India’s present policy, he continues, “is unbalanced, excessively focussed on the U.S”. 12

India thinks it can manage this U.S. embrace on its own terms. It knows that China and the world will have to take India more seriously, and India will have to give China assurances it is not joining any U.S. “containment of China” strategy. India is not being asked to become a U.S. ally in the way that Japan or Australia are allied, since that would be impossible anyway.

India’s Prime Minister has declared that India’s new role in the world will be defined by how it manages globalisation. That is a far cry from Nehru. And it dictates a diplomacy to underwrite entrepreneurship, markets and technology, with all that implies for a more positive view of the U.S.

 

 

ENDNOTES:

1. Cited in Frontline, 17–30 June 2006.

2. Ibid.

3. Mark Thirlwell, The Changing Geography of International Trade: China, India and world trade (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 2005).

4. See India Today, 22 August 2005.

5. For more details, see Sharif Shuja, “Behind Washington’s nuclear deal with India”, News Weekly (Melbourne), 27 August 2005, page 7.

6. Ibid.

7. Abdul Kalam (now President of India), who was in charge of the Agni rocket programme, and five other scientists, spent some time studying at NASA. An example of the significance of this type of interchange may be seen in the report of the U.S. National Science Foundation, Indian Scientific Strengths: Selected Opportunities for Indo-U.S. Cooperation (Washington DC, 1987). The report advocated closer links in a number of important areas in science and technology. Its members included a number of U.S. Indians prominent in scientific and business circles.

8. Some of these key appointees are: Karan K Bhatia, deputy under secretary for Industry and Security; Neil Patel, assistant to Vice-President Dick Cheney for Special Projects; Gopal Khanna, chief information officer at the Peace Corps; Amit Sachdev, associate commissioner for legislative affairs. For details, see Ashish Kumar Sen, “All the President’s men and women”, Sunday Times of India, 27 July 2003, page 3.

9. Cited in Outlook, 17 May 2004.

10. Sharif Shuja, “Could U.S.-India nuclear deal undermine security?”, News Weekly, 13 May 2006, page 17.

11. Ibid. Also see “America and India: George Bush’s passage to India”, The Economist, Vol. 378, No. 8466, 25 February 2006, pages 11-12.

12. Frontline, 2–15 July 2005.

 

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Sharif M. Shuja has published articles on international relations in such journals as the Harvard Asia Pacific Review, The Journal of World Affairs and The Review of Policy Issues.

 

 

 

National Observer No. 69 - Winter 2006