How Will Japan’s Defence Change Its Future?

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How Will Japan’s Defence Change Its Future?

Dr. Sharif M. Shuja

Japan has long centred its foreign policy on its bilateral relationship with the United States, a stance supported by the majority of the Japanese. This relationship took its present shape during the decades of the Cold War, and discussions of it within Japan are still based largely on perceptions rooted in the structures of that era.

This is, of course, due in part to the peculiarities of the situation in Asia, including the continued existence of communist governments in China and North Korea. However, there have been some changes.1 Japan is important in U.S. defence calculations.2 Japan-U.S. cooperation has become an integral part of the global security framework with the United States at its core, and the bilateral ties have grown accordingly. The United States will continue to figure importantly in Japan’s defence and security policies. The general feeling is that Japan would like to have even closer relations with Washington, which could help to “guarantee Japan’s security”.3 Japanese strategic thinking, like that of many European countries, generally sees threats in traditional terms,medical activities and constructing facilities for their use.

The war contingency bills have bipartisan support. Earlier, the public opinion poll of 2 April 2003, conducted by Japan’s biggest newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, suggested the majority of the public (54 per cent) were for the amendment to the Constitution. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has also indicated that his country would be prepared to launch a pre-emptive strike against a foreign threat, adopting the most strident position by a Japanese leader since World War II.

His comments reflect the change occurring in Japan’s defence policy from pacifism to a more robust, deterrent- oriented posture. The shift has been prompted by threats from terrorism and a hostile North Korea, which is locked in a confrontation with the United States over its nuclear weapons programme. Almost everyone agrees that this secretive one-party state should not be allowed to continue with its nuclear weapons programme.

The six-party talks4 and the Proliferation Security Initiative5 are cases in point. based upon perceived intentions of other actors, mainly states, with containment and deterrence as the main instruments to ensure national security. American neo-conservatives, however, see security in terms of the possible capabilities of others, requiring pre-emption and regime change to prevent future threats emerging. Under Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, Japan has been an enthusiastic supporter of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, with Japanese combat personnel being despatched overseas for the first time without U.N. authorisation. Moreover, after years of prevaricating, Japan has also signed up to the United States global system of missile defence. Certainly, U.S. pressure had a great deal to do with both decisions, but perhaps more importantly, the rhetoric of the Bush doctrine offered Prime Minister Koizumi a chance to further his nationalist agenda.

Two schools of thought on America have existed in Japan’s decision-making circles. These are (1) the Realist school of thought; and (2) the Liberalist school of thought. Those belonging to the Realist school of thought view America as being guarantor of Japan’s security, and Japanese strategic thinking, like that of many European countries, generally sees threats in traditional terms, based upon perceived intentions of other actors, mainly states, with containment and deterrence as the main instruments to ensure national security.

American neo-conservatives, however, see security in terms of the possible capabilities of others, requiring pre-emption and regime change to prevent future threats emerging. Under Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, Japan has been an enthusiastic supporter of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, with Japanese combat personnel being despatched overseas for the first time without U.N. authorisation.
Moreover, after years of prevaricating, Japan has also signed up to the United States global system of
missile defence. Certainly, U.S. pressure had a great deal to do with both decisions, but perhaps more importantly, the rhetoric of the Bush doctrine offered Prime Minister Koizumi a chance to further his nationalist agenda.

The main issue for Japan’s foreign policy now is how to make international contributions that respond to
the needs of global society while maintaining the alliance with the United States as the centerpiece. These contributions include military efforts, such as Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations, and non-military assistance in economic and technical fields adopt a pro-American stance. These people lack the vision that would allow them to respond effectively to the changes taking place on a global scale. Their position tends to focus primarily on specific circumstances in East Asia and pays little heed to America’s global strategic thinking; the Realist view also puts insufficient weight on recent trends toward alliances based on shared values, particularly human rights and humanitarianism, which are increasingly underpinning responses to regional conflicts. The Realist school does not fully comprehend
that alliances in the post-Cold War era are increasingly based on the presumption that they are justified by certain ideals.

Liberalist thinkers in Japan seek to establish that the end of the Cold War should mean the end of the use of military force. They tend to criticise American involvement in any conflict as a bid for military supremacy, thus feeding the persistent undercurrent of sentiment against the United States among the Japanese people. This sentiment could be described as a kind of antipathy toward absolute power rather than simple anti-Americanism — a sentiment seen not just in Japan but also in France and other European countries. It is a feeling that has grown in reaction to the increasingly interventionist approach the United States has taken in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

NEW INITIATIVES

On 6 June 2003, Japan’s Parliament passed three war contingency bills. These were the Law regarding Response to Armed Attacks, the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, and the Law to amend the Self-Defence Force (S.D.F.). These bills increased the government’s powers in military emergencies. Under the contingency laws, the government will draft a plan of action when there is an attack against Japan or when the government determines that the danger of an attack is imminent. The plan, following the Cabinet approval, must be endorsed by the Diet. In situations deemed particularly urgent, the government is empowered to mobilise the S.D.F. before drawing up a plan, but has to halt
the deployment of forces if the eventual plan is rejected by the Diet. The law also allows the government to put the S.D.F. on standby when it determines that a military attack is “anticipated”.

The amendment to the S.D.F. law enables military personnel to seize land and other property for operations, and exempts the S.D.F. from a range of peacetime legal procedures, such as those concerning road traffic, North Korea revealed its possession of nuclear weapons on 24 April 2003 in the bilateral talks with the United States and China in Beijing. In the talks, North Korean negotiators threatened Assistant Secretary of State, James A. Kelly, and his delegation that they would export nuclear weapons or conduct a “physical demonstration”, indicating that they may conduct a test of a nuclear weapon.

Why are the North Koreans trying to make nuclear weapons? There are four possible uses for nuclear weapons: deterrence, attacking another country, an export earner, and a bargaining chip in negotiations. A nuclear deterrent would certainly stop a U.S. attack, but a North Korean use of that tiny deterrent force, whether in defence or attack, would be suicidal. After the revelations in February 2004 about Pakistan’s nuclear black-market operations, Korean export of nuclear technology would be virtually impossible. They have no exports other than narcotics, missiles and forced labour, and these are all becoming impossible to sustain after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack. That means the real purpose of the weapons is for use as a bargaining chip in a deal for massive aid and possible a security guarantee for the Pyongyang regime.

This North Korean revelation is a problem for Japan. North Korea analyst Gary Samore estimated that over the next few years North Korea could complete facilities capable of producing sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium for up to a dozen nuclear weapons annually, in addition to its suspected current stockpile of one or two nuclear weapons.6 The potential for North Korea to sell such weapons on the black market to rogue states or terrorists, in order to raise much needed funds, is alarming. Furthermore, its ballistic missile programme has the capacity to strike Japan, which is only 8.5 minutes flying time from North Korea. If North Korea were to develop this capacity, Japan would become completely dependent on America’s nuclear umbrella.

This would weaken Japan’s commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its own declared non-nuclear principles. These principles were first announced by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in December 1967, and successive governments have adhered to this policy. However, the principles have been challenged in the new circumstances of the post-Cold War era, especially by nuclear threats from
North Korea or by the rising power of nuclear China. In fact, Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, the chief Cabinet Secretary of the Koizumi Government, told reporters on 31 May 2002, “The [non-nuclear] principles are just like the Constitution.

But in the face of calls to amend the Constitution, amendment of the principles is also likely.”7 Furthermore, an influential opposition leader of the Liberal Party, Ichiro Ozawa, criticised China’s rapid
military build-up in his speech on 6 April 2002, and referred to the potentiality of Japan’s becoming a nuclear power. He said, “If China gets too inflated, the Japanese people will become hysterical in response. We have plenty of plutonium in our nuclear power plants, so it is possible for us to produce 3000 to 4000 nuclear warheads”. 8 The remarks were apparently provoked by the rising power of China and Pyongyang’s unpredictable nuclear threats and anxiety about the effectiveness of security guarantees from the United States. There are various contrary perceptions of Chinese policies in Japan. Public opinion has of late rapidly switched toward viewing China as a threat. A Yomiuri/Gallop poll in March 1997 showed that the percentage of Japanese respondents who named China as a potential threat increased from 18 per cent in 1994 to 39.1 per cent in 1997.9

Many Japanese scholars, however, do not perceive China as posing a direct security threat but, at the same time, some still suggest that the Chinese security policies contain underlying threatening factors. They point out that the lack of transparency in Chinese military expenditure is the source of suspicion and worry for the concerned countries. Others explain the rising perception of the China threat in Japan in terms of China’s expanding military expenditure and equipment, Chinese policy in the South China Sea, its nuclear tests, and the increasing influence of the military in Chinese politics.

Even though these scholars do not accept an immediate China threat thesis, they agree with the long-term potential threat from China. The public, scholars and politicians in Japan assume that, since China is a revisionist state, it has an intention of filling up the power vacuum in the region left behind by the end of the Cold War. Other scholars who take the opposite position assert that China, in respect to military capability and economic resources, does not have the power to pose a threat to Japan. It is true that China has a belligerent image, due to its efforts to modernise the military and its high growth-rate of military expenditure and numerous missile tests, but in reality, Chinese military expenditure is only 10-20 per cent of Japanese defence spending. These scholars claim that the phrase “China as a threat” is an exaggeration and insist that the Japanese Government should induce China to participate in a multilateral security order and help them to improve transparency.

In response to “China as a potential threat” and the intensified threats by North Korea, Japan has transformed its security policy in terms of strengthening Japan-U.S. security cooperation in regional security, and smoothing operations of the Self-Defence Force. Japan possesses a formidable modern
air and naval capability. Having implemented the bulk of a comprehensive build-up plan formulated in the
early 1980s, it has an arsenal that is advanced even by the standards of the major industrial nations. Already ranked second in the world, Japan’s defence spending may enable it to establish cutting-edge military capability, especially in navy and air power. If the Bush administration tries to consolidate U.S. military hegemony by establishing a missile defence system, Japan will plan to magnify its influence
in the Northeast region by obtaining advanced missile technology. Japan has the technology to quickly
convert its space programme to the production of advanced missiles.

NUCLEAR AND MISSILE POLICIES

Over the years, several Japanese Prime Ministers have canvassed the possibility of obtaining nuclear weapons for defensive purposes and staying within the constraints imposed by Japan’s post-war constitution. In 1969, there was even an official report recommending that Japan embark on a weapons programme. In 1993, the then Foreign Minister, Kabun Muto, argued that a nuclear weapons capability
would be important if Japan faced a severe threat. But many Japanese remain opposed to going nuclear.
So far as is known, no programme has been undertaken. Unless there is a radical change in the United States non-proliferation policy, Japan would also face intense opposition from Washington if it claimed it could no longer rely on sheltering under America’s nuclear umbrella.

Japan could succeed in building such weapons quickly, possibly within a year. Japan’s nuclear power programme has generated huge stockpiles of plutonium, which it has been allowed to separate in reprocessing facilities. Compared with North Korea’s ability to generate enough plutonium to make one weapon a year, Japan already has enough to make more than 1000 warheads.10 Nor does anyone doubt that it has the technical skill to incorporate its plutonium into an effective fission weapon deliverable by plane or long-range missile. Japan is now thinking about a sophisticated missile defence system to protect her against incoming missiles.

In fact, the cabinet decided on 19 December 2003 to work with the United States to deploy a ballistic missile defence system (B.M.D.).11 This decision is a significant shift from its “pacifist” stance and is likely to have far-reaching implications for security in the Asia-Pacific region. Until now, Japan’s work on missile defence, spurred by North Korea’s test of a long-range missile in 1998, has been limited to research and development. Under the new plan, Tokyo will contribute ¥100 billion to acquire key U.S.-made technologies, with a further ¥600 billion contribution expected over the next five years. Washington
will provide substantive technological support to Tokyo’s B.M.D. project. The shield will include Standard Missile- 3 (S.M.-3), to be launched from Aegis equipped naval destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles, and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (P.A.C.-3) missiles to shoot down any remaining missiles from the ground.12 While “pacifists” and “Gaullists” still abound in Japan, the B.M.D. issue has not been put to a stringent public opinion test in the way Prime Minister Koizumi’s pro-U.S. stance has been. concern
about Japan and U.S. collaboration on missile defence, warning it would have “negative effects on regional stability and security”. However, Japanese Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba rejected complaints
that the move would threaten regional stability. “We don’t need to shoot interceptor missiles if they don’t launch their missiles, so I think the nature of the system is entirely defensive, thus constitutionally possible, and it matches with Japan’s exclusively defensive posture”,13 he said.

Mr Ishiba also acknowledged that Washington regarded Tokyo’s participation in the missile defence project as a litmus test of its commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan’s participation in the missile
defence shield will necessitate changes in Tokyo’s existing ban on the export of arms. Amendments to the control regime, which already has some exceptions for the United States, will be necessary to enable the development of integrated missile defence systems. The move will enable Japanese defence
contractors to participate in the development of missile defence technologies. The Japanese Foreign Ministry noted on 19 December 2003 that “Japan has been conducting technological research of B.M.D. with the United States and has now come to the conclusion that it is desirable to introduce the system for the purpose of enhancing peace and security of the nation and for strengthening the Japan-U.S.
Security Alliance”.14 The multi-layer defence system will consist of the Aegis B.M.D. know-how and the Patriot P.A.C.-3 equipment, both of U.S. origin.

Cognisant of the shockwaves that the move could send across the Asia- Pacific region, the Koizumi administration took care to emphasise that the move was entirely “defensive” and that it would have “no threatening implication for the neighbouring countries and areas and no ill-effect on the stability in the region . . As and when necessary, Japan would explain its position so as to gain international understanding”, 15 it added. As of now, two aspects of the decision on the B.M.D. system stand out.
First, the Japan-U.S. alliance accounts for not only the B.M.D.’s perceived viability but also for Tokyo’s decision to send troops to Iraq on a “non-combat” mission at this stage. According to analysts in the region, Tokyo’s decision regarding Iraq has something to do with the need to stay on the right side of the United States and to be counted upon for reconstruction contracts, especially in view of the Bush
dictum of exclusiveness in such matters. 16 Referring to U.S.-Tokyo ties on the eve of the 21stt century, Yoichi Funabashi and others in the Japanese strategic affairs community had spoken of an “alliance adrift”. In mid- 2003, Yutaka Kawashima, a former Japanese diplomat who had risen to the rank of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, examined various scenarios before concluding that “all sorts of reservations
and criticism in Japan itself regarding U.S. actions will be vociferously expressed”. However, in his opinion, “Japan’s best option seems to be to work closely with the United States”.

The second aspect is that the new system could either be a forerunner of, or indeed become an integral part of, the theatre missile defence system (T.M.D.) proposed by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan has been undertaking joint technological research just on T.M.D., covering U.S. military forces in Japan. T.M.D., which had focused on shortand medium-range ballistic missiles, is now likely to merge with a programme targeting intercontinental missiles. The Japan-U.S. research being conducted on sea-based systems will become part of the missile defence programme as a whole.

THE ROAD AHEAD

With respect to the common security, Japan is invited to share burdens based on concepts devised in Washington and transmitted to Tokyo as received truth. This approach, according to Henry Kissinger, has generated fewer overt challenges to American dominance than it has in Europe because “[I]t has served Japanese purposes to acquiesce in the suggested military build-up and enhanced strategic role. For it enables the country to move toward a more assertive international role and to extend its strategic
and political reach without exposing itself to opprobrium for pursuing a forward national policy”.17 Strategic dialogue between the two nations has been intermittent, partly because Japan has concentrated on its economic build-up, leaving security policy largely to the United States, and also because of the Japanese national style, which seeks decision via consensus rather than confrontation.

Whether through renewed nationalism, Japan would seek its autonomy from American security and foreign policies cannot be ruled out. This imposes two requirements on the United States: to continue American engagement in Asia — symbolised by the American military presence — and to redefine the Japanese-American alliance. Without an American military presence in Asia, Japan will be increasingly drawn to security and foreign policies based on national impulses. When Japan and the United States formulate their policies in concert, Japan’s build-up of an autonomous military power will be both limited
and defined by a strategic context, and the impact of this build-up on the rest of Asia will be far less disturbing.

A new dimension must therefore be given to bilateral political dialogue and to the coordination of foreign policies, especially in Asia.

• • •

Bibliography Hirotaka, Watanabe, “Japan in a Changing World”, Japan Echo, Vol. 29, No. 4 (August 2002).
Samore, Gary, “The Korean Nuclear Crisis”, Survival, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Spring 2003).
Taner, Richard, “North Korea: Beyond Realpolitik”, Spinach7, Issue 3 (Autumn/Winter 2004).
News Weekly, 29 November 2003.
Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 March 1997.
Toohey, Brian, “The New Nuclear Threat”, The Weekend Australian Financial Review, 1-2 March 2003.
“Farewell to Pacifism”, Frontline, 16 January 2004.
“Japan Embraces Missiles”, Australian Financial Review, 20-21 December 2003.
Shuja, Sharif, “Northeast Asia and US Policy”, Contemporary Review, Vol. 281, No. 1639 (August 2002).

1. For details, see Watanabe Hirotaka, “Japan in a Changing World”, Japan Echo,
Vol. 29, No. 4 (August 2002), page 18.

2. The importance of Japan in U.S. defence calculations was illustrated in a candid address given at Deakin University’s Security Studies Seminar in Melbourne on 18 July 2002 by Professor Aaron L. Friedberg. Friedberg, who directs Princeton University’s Research Program in International Security, spoke on “Changing Great Power Relations in East Asia with the War on Terrorism”. In his talk, which the author attended, Friedberg said that following the September 11 events, the United States is improving relations with Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and India, while further strengthening relations with its allies such as Japan, Australia, Taiwan and Pakistan.

3. Interviews by the author with Toshiya Nakamura, Professor of International Journalism at the Siebold University of Nagasaki, in Melbourne, November 2004.

4. This is a new multilateral forum in Northeast Asia, in which all the region’s major powers sit down with the two Koreas to persuade Pyongyang of the need to abandon its obsession with weapons of mass destruction.

5. Washington leads this Proliferation Security Initiative (P.S.I.) to intervene in the global arms trade. A mix of conventional law enforcement, intelligence and naval firepower, the P.S.I. has tightened international cooperation in blocking weapons exports, especially missile sales. It began with 13 nations, including Australia, and has expanded to almost 80.

6. Gary Samore, “The Korean Nuclear Crisis”, Survival, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Spring 2003), page 7. Also see, Richard Taner, “North Korea: Beyond Realpolitik”, Spinach7, Issue 3 (Autumn/Winter 2004), pages 25-29.

7. Cited in News Weekly, 29 November 2003, page 18.

8. Ibid.

9. Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 March 1997.

10. Cited in Brian Toohey, “The New Nuclear Threat”, The Weekend Australian Financial Review, 1-2 March 2003, page 22.

11. “Farewell to Pacifism”, Frontline, 16 January 2004, page 49.

12. “Japan Embraces Missiles”, Australian Financial Review, 20-21 December 2003, page 9.

13. Ibid.

14. Frontline, 16 January 2004, page 50.

15. Ibid.

16. Interviews by the author with Kaori Okano, Senior Lecturer in Asian Studies and Convenor of JapanesePolitics at La Trobe University, in Melbourne, November 2004.

17. Sharif Shuja, “Northeast Asia and U.S. Policy”, Contemporary Review, Vol. 281, No. 1639 (August 2002), pages 73-86.

National Observer No. 65 - Winter 2005