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National Observer Home > No. 43 - Summer 2000 > Book Review John Curtin - A Lifeby David DaySydney, Harper Collins, 1999, pp.596 and index. This book should be seen in the context of the continual search for credible Labor Party icons. Dr. Evatt, Mr. Lionel Murphy and Mr. Gough Whitlam have been found lacking, and it is not surprising that the search has been diverted to more apparently promising quarters. John Curtin was born in 1885, of a father (a politician and later a publican) who was in poor general health and was ultimately to die of syphilis. By 1902 Curtin was already attending Labor meetings. He became at once a fervent socialist, and soon a member of the Socialist Party. He was "prepared to concede the necessity for violence if socialism was to be achieved", and his views were similar to those that subsequently became communist philosophy. But as did many socialists, he joined the Labor Party and was president of the Brunswick branch in 1908. There is no doubt that Curtin's adherence to socialism was intense and even fanatical. He had left school early and lacked a critical appreciation of public issues. The author describes him as bipolar, subject to alternating manic and gloomy states, and he became a heavy drinker. Over many years he vigorously supported a radical activist, Tom Mann, who was tried for sedition and unlawful assembly but was, surprisingly, acquitted. He supported unionists attacking non-unionists. In retrospect Curtin may be seen to have been not only fanatical but also unbalanced in his views. He frequently called for a revolution. If his exhortations had been more successful he might have overseen the execution of his class enemies, as occurred under various communist revolutions (he eulogised the Russian revolution). Curtin's claims to approval depend, first, upon his urging in the 1930s that Australia should depend less on the United Kingdom for its defence, and secondly, upon his actions as Prime Minister during the Second World War. On the first issue Curtin appears to have been merely partly correct. It was not safe to rely merely on Britain for defence assistance. But doubtless in view of inveterate socialist prejudices he went too far in depreciating the strategic advantages of British support. Further, in retrospect more should have been done to consolidate the support of the United States. (Indeed, although Mr. Robert Menzies has been criticised in some quarters for dispatching the Second A.I.F. to help the defence against Germany, his decision was made in difficult circumstances and was supportable at the time. Mr. Menzies' actions are difficult to assess in retrospect, in view of the partisan attitudes of his critics and of his defenders.) Curtin's own assessments of Australia's position were by no means necessarily sound. In 1941, for example, Curtin argued for more Australian troops to be sent to Singapore. In November of that year, as Prime Minister, he made no efforts to recall Australian forces to meet the new Japanese threat and even committed further forces to the Middle East. From December 1941 especially Curtin was active in drawing Australia towards the United States, rather than Britain. This appears to have been a correct policy. But it is likely that in the new circumstances a similar course would have been taken by a non-Labor government. Further, there is a serious question whether an alienation from Britain was contributed to by Irish or partisan anti-establishment attitudes within the Labor government. In fact, Curtin was too slow in requiring the return of Australian troops to Australia or other places where they were not to be immediately overwhelmed by Japanese forces. In this way Australian security was further jeopardised. There is no doubt that Curtin had, at least until his last years, a sincere belief in a species of socialism that in retrospect appears naive. His personal distress and unhappiness whilst Prime Minister reflected a partial loss of faith, a consciousness of illusions, and disquiet towards many members of his own party like Eddie Ward who were unable to subordinate socialist or even communist leanings to the preservation of Australia within the War. As his death approached, there was no light on the hill. During the latter part of the War Curtin necessarily withdrew further from radical policies. Long a fervent supporter of the White Australia policy, he began to express increasing support for links with Britain and, indeed, departed from the previous Labor policy of appointing Australians as Governor-General. It is not easy to appraise Curtin in retrospect. On the one hand, he was a serious and obsessive person, although his socialist objectives may be seen in retrospect to have been naive and ill-informed. Certainly he was morally far superior to such later leaders as Messrs. Hawke and Keating, who were perceived to be ambitious and distasteful, or Mr. Gough Whitlam, who was perceived to be of poor judgement and malicious to a high degree. But on the other hand, how can one know whether some other leader — such as Mr. Robert Menzies — would have been better or worse during the War years? There was no distinctive characteristic of Curtin that proved that he would have been better or worse than a number of other potential leaders of the time. The writing of biographies or histories is a difficult task, because writers have biases. In the present case Dr. Day may not perhaps be more biased or less biased than some other authors, but certainly he shows himself to be more committed to certain views than one might have hoped. In general, he is markedly pro-Curtin and anti-Menzies in his analysis. It is not easy to have faith in biographies or histories, of recent subject matters especially. Prejudices abound. According to the political views of the writer one may find a favourable or unfavourable presentation of a subject. In the present case John Curtin - A Life should be received with caution. It has been extensively researched, but the conclusion is difficult to avoid that it is excessively one-sided. An authoritative biography of Curtin, a much over-rated Prime Minister, is still awaited. I.C.F. Spry National Observer No. 43 - Summer 2000 | |