National Observer Home > No. 43 - Summer 2000 > Book Review

GERM WARFARE HOLDS A KEY TO THE FUTURE OF US ALL

by Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman

London: Hutchinson, 1999, pp. 319.

Ken Alibek, born in 1950, is a Kazakh and the most outstanding member of the Soviet military-scientific establishment to have come to the West. His contribution to the defence not only of the West but of the entire world is unique. In 1975 he graduated from the military faculty of the Medical Institute in Tomsk (western Siberia), specialising in infectious diseases and epidemiology. As a postgraduate in microbiology he wrote his Ph.D. thesis on the development of plague and tularaemia as biological weapons, and subsequently became a Doctor of Science, working on the biotechnology needed to manufacture anthrax on an industrial scale.

A talented and hard-working specialist, Alibek rose quickly in the field of Soviet biological warfare. His career peaked in the years 1988-92, when he was the first deputy head of Biopreparat, the Soviet (and then post-Soviet) state pharmaceutical agency whose main function was to develop and produce weapons made from the most dangerous viruses, toxins and bacteria known to man, such as anthrax, tularaemia, smallpox, Q fever, brucellosis, glanders, plague and many others. The authors explain that Biopreparat was the hub of a clandestine research empire whose testing and manufacturing facilities extended to over forty sites in Russia and Kazakhstan. Nearly every important institution played a role in the Soviet biological weapons programme�the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, the Academy of Sciences, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and, of course, the K.G.B. This means that in the final years of the U.S.S.R., Alibek was the second most important person working on the development and production of biological weapons.

In 1992 Alibek and his family made their way to the United States, where he was kept under wraps for a full six years. The data gathered from his debriefing sessions was given the very highest security grading�Alibek himself was not provided with copies of the transcripts. Last year he went public, and now we have the chance to read a book containing information which until recently was regarded in Washington, London and Bonn as so important that only a handful of top Western intelligence officials were given access.

Alibek tells the story of the development of Soviet bacteriological weapons in the context of his own unusual life, providing entertaining (and frequently bloodcurdling) details and anecdotes. His scientific and technical elucidations are both highly competent and readily comprehensible to any lay reader.

The Soviet Union began working on biological weapons as early as the 1920s. After the Second World War, Moscow made rapid advances in this area by acquiring know-how from Japan, whose armed forces had been working successfully on bacteriological weaponry, and from the United States (provided, in all probability, by Soviet agents).

In 1947 the U.S.S.R. established its first smallpox weapons factory just outside the ancient cathedral town of Zagorsk, forty minutes' drive north of Moscow. Within a few years, smallpox was regarded as an important weapon. The Soviet military command ordered that the annual stockpile of smallpox be held at twenty tons. Before long, huge supplies of anthrax and plague were also accumulated. In 1972, 140 countries signed the Biological Weapons Convention, pledging not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain "biological agents for offensive military purposes." The United States and the United Kingdom fulfilled all the clauses of the convention to the letter (and in spirit), destroying their stocks of biological weapons and closing down all their production facilities. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, continued to develop its facilities, ignoring all international agreements. Naturally, until the end of the Cold War everything that pertained to this area of activity was regarded as top-secret.

It was Leonid Brezhnev's decision to activate the so-called Enzyme Project and set up the Biopreparat organisation to carry out a wide-ranging programme for the further development of biological weapons. Some of the best Soviet biologists, epidemiologists and biochemists took part in this programme. The Enzyme Project focused on tularaemia, plague, anthrax and glanders, all of which had been successfully "weaponised" by Soviet military scientists but whose effects had been undermined by the development of antibiotics. But many other agents were also kept in mind, including smallpox, Ebola, Marburg (a variety of Ebola), Machupo and Junin.

Over a short period of time dozens of biological warfare installations, disguised as pharmaceutical or medical research centres, were built throughout the country. An entire "research city" for genetic engineering went up at Obolensk, just south of Moscow. Over 60,000 people were engaged in research, testing and production.

It was also the Brezhnev "period of stagnation" that saw the beginning of the mass production of artillery shells and bombs carrying biological agents. It was far from easy to select these agents, because they were to be produced in bulk, and had to be reproducible in large quantities, of high virulence and easily transportable. One agent that met all these requirements was Anthrax 836, discovered by Soviet scientists in 1953. One of Biopreparat's greatest achievements was to create the infrastructure that enabled hundreds of bombs to be filled with this type of anthrax.

Alibek writes that when the Cold War intensified between 1981 and 1984 the Soviet military-industrial community genuinely believed that the United States might try to annihilate the U.S.S.R. In his view, it was conceivable that "Soviet army strategists would call for a pre-emptive strike, perhaps with biological weapons".

Cold War prejudices still made themselves felt under Gorbachev, who signed a five-year plan to expand the development of biological weapons. Alibek writes that this was "the most ambitious programme for biological weapons development ever given" to his organisation. By this time, the warheads of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles had been filled with biological substances for some years. Then in 1988, at the height of glasnost  and perestroika, a decision was taken to arm SS-18 missiles with disease agents. The giant missiles, which could carry ten 500-kiloton warheads apiece over a range of 6,000 miles, had never before been considered as delivery vehicles for a biological attack. This required the production of anthrax and plague to be increased to 500-600 kilograms a day. The Soviet military-industrial community responded to this challenge with enthusiasm. Apparently, no one experienced any pangs of conscience; as Alibek puts it, "I don't remember giving a moment's thought to the fact that we had just sketched out a plan to kill millions of people." In 1989 preparations got under way to equip cruise missiles with biological warheads, marking a clear escalation in the arms race. 

In 1988 the West demanded permission from Moscow to inspect sites that they suspected were being used for the development and production of biological weapons. Gorbachev issued instructions to set up mobile facilities in order to keep the weapon-assembly lines a few steps away from the inspection teams. Other devious plans were readied in the hope of duping Western inspectors. (The authors note that Iraq later made good use of Soviet expertise in this area.) American and British inspection teams who visited various sites where the most sophisticated play-acting went on pretended to believe the solemn assurances that the U.S.S.R. was observing the convention. According to Alibek, the foreign inspectors knew quite well by then what the real situation was, thanks to testimony from recent Soviet defectors. Western governments simply decided to keep quiet about these violations so as not to cause additional difficulties for Gorbachev, whose reforms and moves towards rapprochement with the West they supported.

For the Soviet scientists and public, the infatuation with bacteriological warfare created many victims and caused many tragedies. The number of serious accidents is still unclear, although the authors have something to say about a number of them. Alibek states that he caught tularaemia during an experiment but treated himself by immediately taking increased doses of antibiotics. One of his close colleagues, wearing three layers of protective clothing, gave a Marburg injection to a (literal) guinea pig. While doing so, he accidentally punctured his protective gloves with the syringe and infected himself. All efforts to save him failed, and he died in agony from internal haemorrhaging. In 1953 anthrax entered the sewage system of the city of Kirov, but fortunately the damage was contained. In 1979, in Sverdlovsk, a mechanical failure at one of the largest Soviet factories producing biological weapons caused some dust containing anthrax spores and chemical additives to be swept through the exhaust pipes into the air. Hundreds of local inhabitants fell ill and most of them died. It was as though they were victims of an epidemic. The local Communist Party boss, Boris Yeltsin, wanted to be informed as to exactly what had happened, but so high was its secrecy rating that the information was withheld. According to Alibek, Yeltsin, "outraged, stormed over to the factory and demanded entry. He was refused, on the orders of Defence Minister Dimitry Ustinov." The K.G.B. began working frantically to cover the traces. It was put about that the victims had been poisoned by some "rotten meat". And although Yeltsin himself acknowledged the real cause of the "epidemic" in his autobiography, even today the Russian military establishment is continuing to insist on the "bad meat" explanation. Naturally, thousands of animals used in experiments (rabbits, guinea pigs, monkeys, etc) suffered excruciating torments and perished. On one occasion 500 monkeys were purchased in Africa for tularaemia tests. For some reason no one in the West or in the (former) U.S.S.R. has publicly asked why so many monkeys were required at the same time. Before long almost all of them had died.

Towards the end of his period in power, Gorbachev issued instructions to close down enterprises manufacturing biological weapons. However, production continued in secret. In 1992 Russia signed a commitment to the United States and the United Kingdom to put an end to its biological weapons programme. Last year, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to accelerated negotiations to strengthen the 1972 convention; international inspection teams will visit various countries to investigate suspicious outbreaks of disease and check out the local biological facilities.  However, in the opinion of the authors, the threat of a biological attack has increased as the knowledge of lethal formulations acquired over decades in Soviet laboratories has leaked out to terrorist groups, to the Russian mafia and, most importantly, to rogue regimes, to whose ranks can be ascribed, among others, Libya, North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Cuba. Former Soviet specialists are already working in many of these countries. Alibek writes that these weapons "are cheap, easy to make, and easy to use. In the coming years, they will become very much a part of our lives."

In the West, Alibek has been shocked by the flippancy and the alarming level of complacency regarding biological weapons. He felt it was his duty to try to dispel such ignorance. By writing this book he has succeeded brilliantly in achieving his aim.

Oleg Gordievsky

National Observer No. 43 - Summer 2000