National Observer Home > No. 46 - Spring 2000 > Book Reviews

Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of Australian Defence Policy

by David Horner

Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 2000, pp. 408 and index.

This is a comprehensive and well-researched biography of Sir Frederick Shedden, the controversial Defence Secretary from 1937 to 1956.

As Professor Horner shows, Shedden was a highly resourceful public servant, who was energetic and superlatively skilled in bureaucratic warfare. He established himself in a position of great power as Defence Secretary, so that to a large extent the Chiefs of the Services were by-passed and he was himself enabled to supply defence advice and influence military decisions, without however having had military training.

Shedden's determined arrogation of power requires careful analysis. He cannot escape a substantial part of the blame for the disastrous loss of almost twenty-thousand Australians on the capture of Singapore, representing a defeat on such a scale not on any other occasion incurred by Australians. His attempted side-lining of Field-Marshal Blamey was facilitated by Curtin's willingness to follow his advice. (One of the curious myths that have survived from the Second World War relates to Curtin's leadership qualities: the recent biography of Curtin by David Day, reviewed in Number 43 of the National Observer, demonstrates profound weakness in Curtin's character and leadership.) So by a letter drafted by Shedden and signed by Curtin and delivered to General MacArthur on 18 April 1942 MacArthur was advised that he was being placed "in Supreme Command of [Australia's] Navy, Army and Air Force". This very questionable step was attributable to Shedden's influence, as was the equally questionable assumption of power and influence generally by Shedden with the attempted exclusion of the Chiefs of the Services. In the important recent working paper by Lt. Colonel James, published by the Australian Defence Studies Centre, it is stated that Field Marshal Alanbrooke noted that "the Australian C.O.S.C. were completely, and most improperly, subservient to Shedden who had acquired too much power" and that he was "particularly horrified at Shedden's presumption and abuse of power and propriety in advising the government and answering international cables on clearly military matters without even consulting the Australian C.O.S.C."

Although Professor Horner's book has been carefully researched, and will be of value to those concerned with Australia's past and present defence structure and operations, it is disappointing in that it presents Shedden in a somewhat too favourable light. The same is also true of the author's treatment of Curtin. An appraisal of optimal defence structures has become a matter of urgency for Australia, and an analysis of the detriment caused by undue power reposed in the defence bureaucracy is long over-due.

I.C.F.Spry

 

National Observer No. 46 - Spring 2000