National Observer Home > No. 64 - Autumn 2005 > Articles
Goodbye To All That: Keith Windshuttle on White Australia
R.J. Stove
It is not obvious why anyone would
actively seek the title of “Australia’s
best living historian.” The very phrase
suggests some surreal Guinness Book
of Records entry, on the lines of “wittiest
man in Luxembourg” or “greatest
rock group ever produced by Bangladesh”.
What is perfectly obvious is
that nowadays, Keith Windschuttle
alone among Australians consistently
threatens the historiographical preeminence
of Geoffrey Blainey. One
suspects that Blainey himself hails
this development. Any major thinker
cherishes competitors talented
enough to be worth fretting about. He
may, as Newton said of himself, stand
on giants’ shoulders; but he can never
be content with his exalted location if
his only confrères are earthbound
midgets.
Between Windschuttle and Blainey
lie similarities as notable as — if less
manifest than — their differences.
Both men are conspicuously honest,
for one thing (eccentric though it
would have seemed to our grandparents
that possessing mere honesty
might one day appear an unusual intellectual
virtue). Accordingly, both
men interest themselves more in wherever
their researches take them, than
in half-baked polemics: though
Windschuttle’s temperament has a
steely argumentative edge, and a relish
for combat, which Blainey’s lacks.
Yet either man’s merits would have
been in vain if they had been expressed
through turgid prose. In fact, both
Blainey and Windschuttle are blessed
with the gift of rare, addictive readability.
This readability takes different
forms with each writer. With Blainey,
it reveals itself as a heightened poetic
consciousness, a feather-light perception of the beauty and menace in nature,
even the beauty and menace in
those industrial processes which from
Stalin’s tame artists inspired torrents
of novel social-realist garbage.
Windschuttle’s, by contrast, is an output
as unpoetic as any black-letter
lawyer’s case-notes. Some ill-wishers
think of Windschuttle as a hanging
judge. One element of truth resides in
the metaphor: namely, that his
historiographical outlook is forensic
rather than ambiguous or hesitating.
He does not moralise. He does not
empathise. He adjudicates. He can
convey opponents’ theses with often
devastating fairness – generally in
clearer language than those opponents
condescend to use — but when the
time comes for him to put on the black
cap, he puts on the black cap.
Perhaps a danger exists in the
Windschuttle approach: the danger of
positivism, of supposing that if an
event is officially undocumented it
never occurred. (As every student of
mediaeval European history – or of
some other area where documentation
remains frustratingly fragmented and
scarce – soon realises, what people assume
happened can be almost as significant
as what actually happened.)
Not that Windschuttle himself has
been guilty of positivism in the above
crude form. Still, some of his less intelligent
supporters certainly have
been; and their misreadings of
Windschuttle’s conclusions as a licence
to canonise Gradgrind and
Scrooge become intrinsically instructive,
however unfortunate.
Hence the particular importance of
Windschuttle’s latest and best book,
titled (with a traightforwardness
characteristic of its creator) The White
Australia Policy.1 Many among those
who cheered on The Fabrication of
Aboriginal History’s first volume will
find The White Australia Policy an irritant.
For Windschuttle – similar to
Blainey in his reserves of moral courage,
though without, it seems,
Blainey’s Christian beliefs – has dared
to desecrate Australian political modernism’s
Holy of Holies. That thricesacred
relic, of course, is the belief in
the White Australia Policy’s unremitting
malevolence: a belief that unites
the Rent-A-Mob Left with the Rent-
A-Sleaze Right. To the Rent-A-Mob
Left, the Policy must always be abominable
as the birthmark of “institutional
racism” on Australia’s body
politic. To the Rent-A-Sleaze Right,
the Policy must always be equally
abominable, as Australia’s greatest
and longest-lasting barrier to utopian
visions of “the global economy”.
(Whatever this slogan may mean in =
textbooks, we have all grown only too
aware of what it means in practice: a
permanent male underclass of bachelors
and divorcés, gutted by anti-marriage
femocrats’ employment policies;
unable to imagine the concept of a
“family wage” even in its dreams; and indistinguishable from the atomised
flotsam of Mexican barrios and Brazilian
favelas, save by the Latinos’
comparative paucity of television
sets.) Therefore Windschuttle’s production
contains material bound to
offend everyone, except that minuscule
minority which prefers truth to
chic. The fact that Windschuttle’s own
politics would seem to be of a thoroughly
temperate sort — close to
Chifley and Attlee, with no tincture of
turbo-capitalism, let alone of white
supremacism — will probably compound
rather than reduce his opponents’ rancour.
The particular Rent-A-Mob Left fable
condemned by Windschuttle flourishes
like bindweed in the history departments
of our “universities”, being
upheld in its pure form by — to cite
only the best-known names — Lyndall
(“Historians are always making up figures”)
Ryan, Henry Reynolds, and
Mary Kalantzis. This depositum fidei– for we really are talking here about
a religious hallucination, impervious
to reasoning – can be summarised,
with only slight parodistic elements,
as follows:
• By the late nineteenth century
Australia had become a multicultural
paradise, in which the Anglo lion lay
down with the Afghan lamb, and in
which the Oriental selflessly laboured
to induct us within (to coin a phrase)
The Greater Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere. Such lamentable departures
from this state of innocence as the
goldfields’ anti-Chinese riots can be
explained, though not excused, by the
tragic absence of Eureka Street, The
Sunday Age, and Sir William Deane.
• Alas, into “this other Eden” there
entered a serpent, in the shape of Federation’s
biological racists. These satanic
traitors, such as Edmund Barton
and Alfred Deakin, bound Australia
hand and foot with the chains of the
White Australia Policy. And the great
hopes of maintaining the pre-1901
polyethnic haven were therefore
doomed. Then behold, the veil of the
multicultural temple was torn in two
from top to bottom, and the earth
quaked, and the rocks were split, and
the Thousand-Year Aryan Reich of
Menzies came to pass. And every
man’s hand was against Australia, and
Australia’s hand was against every
man. And the very name of Australia
was cursed by the tribes of Manhattan
and Madras and Manila and
Mogadishu, yea, even unto the seventh
generation.
• It subsequently required the Four
Just Men — Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke,
and Keating — to wash away White
Australia’s sins. But the forces of evil
returned, in the shape of the Fascist
Howard, who reimposed the Menzies
Aryan dictatorship. And the land
brought forth white picket fences. And
there was darkness and gnashing of
asylum-seekers’ teeth.
Conflicting interpretations of the
same dogma do, naturally, exist. Thus, whereas for Reynolds the primary Axis
of Evil consisted of non-Labor leaders
like Barton,2 veteran Maoist
Humphrey McQueen saved most of
his bile for the embryonic Labor
Party.3 But these are mere theological
quibbles, to be expected among
chronically disputatious high priests.
On the central doctrine they agree
readily enough.
Windschuttle’s need to refute this
doctrine causes him to give unexpected
emphasis — almost two-thirds
of his book — to pre-1901 Australian
history. He appreciates that Barton
and Deakin did not emerge, and could
not have emerged, out of the blue; that
even The Bulletin’s firm advocacy of
“Australia for the White Man” did not
exist in a vacuum (although he is sceptical
about the ultimate influence
which The Bulletin wielded). What,
then, were the Policy’s actual, as opposed
to alleged, origins?
In answering this question,
Windschuttle alludes to societies as
different from pre-Federation and immediately
post-Federation Australia
as can be imagined. Since some of
these allusions comprise the very few
disappointing parts of his narrative,
let us specify where he fails to convince.
He is right, he is one hundred times
right, in accentuating the theological
rather than ethnic basis for pre-Reformation
Christendom’s hostility towards
Muslims and Jews. In his own
words: “both these groups were attacked
because of their religion, not
their race. Indeed, in fifteenth-century
Spain . . . [they] were given the choice
of changing their religion, which many
chose to do, an option that would not
have been available had their persecution
been based on biological
grounds.”4 (This, of course, is bad
news for those Christophobes — the
James Carrolls, the John Cornwells,
the Daniel Goldhagens, etc. etc. — who
make lucrative authorial careers from
blaming Nazism on Catholic
“antisemitism”; but since such mountebanks’ particular discipline is
victimology rather than history, they
need not detain cultural literates for
longer than is needed to note their
deplorable existence.)
Problems arise, and Windschuttle’s
own persuasiveness temporarily fails,
elsewhere in the same chapter. “One
thing now clear”, he writes, “is that
modern biological science has been
unable to define people by race either
in terms of their external physical
characteristics or their inherited genetic make-up. Race is an unscientific
category.”5 Examining Windschuttle’s
sources for this and the paragraph’s
other assertions, we discover what
Americans call “the same old sameold”:
in other words, citations of Marxist
and quasi-Marxist gurus who
lusted after blatant political power and
who cared little or nothing for truth.
Ashley Montagu, Margaret Mead and
Sir Julian Huxley are all there. Of
these, Montagu (né Israel Ehrenburg)
emerged from the anthropological atelier
of Franz Boas — who devoted his
whole later life to condoning and publicising
environmentalist mythomania,
most notoriously in the case of
Mead’s Samoans — and became, even
by Boasian standards, a gross apologist
for Stalinism. “Soviet Russia,” declared
Montagu in 1942, “is the outstanding
example of perfect management
of ethnic group relations under
unusually difficult economic conditions.”
6 Predictably, he afterwards
churned out the Statement on Race
issued by U.N.E.S.C.O., of which
Huxley served as the first Director-
General. Huxley’s own notions of science,
although couched in language
less absurd than Montagu’s, make for
equally ominous reading. In Huxley’s
view, U.N.E.S.C.O.’s role should entail
“taking the techniques of persuasion
and information and true propaganda
that we have learnt to apply nationally
in war, and deliberately bending
them to the international tasks of
peace, if necessary utilising them – as
Lenin envisaged — to ‘overcome the
resistance of millions’ to desirable
change.”7
To place one’s trust in the veracity
of these social engineers is to ignore
all the genetic and medical discoveries
since the Boasians first flourished:
discoveries that point in entirely the
opposite direction. Academic literature
demonstrating the reality of racial
distinctions, particularly as they
affect susceptibility to diseases,8 has
by now grown so large that its importance
is admitted (with whatever reluctance)
in all cultures possessing
even marginally greater intellectual
freedom than Australia’s. One need
not concur with a peevish recent
white-nationalist attack on Windschuttle,9 to admit that writing
on race as if The Bell Curve and Why
Race Matters and IQ and the Wealth
of Nations10 had never been published
does give the proverbial hostages to
fortune, though it would be par for the
Sunday Age course.
On page after page of The White
Australia Policy’s subsequent chapters,
revelations abound. Windschuttle
shows, first, that the Policy
derived mainly from economic rather
than from racialist motives; second,
that it made eminent civic sense from
the standpoint of those social classes
which advocated it; third, that most
Australians during the Policy’s operation
proved perfectly capable of living
amicably with non-whites, and needed
no multicultural mafia to force upon
them this desirable outcome; fourth,
that comparisons of the Policy to
Afrikaaners’ apartheid — comparisons
profuse within such fever-swamps as
Humphrey McQueen’s brain — are
ludicrous. This last conclusion
Windschuttle validates with spectacular
ease, and the preceding three he
validates with heroic diligence. In a
strange way, notwithstanding his erudite
professionalism, Windschuttle
represents the achievement of the
commonsensical amateur. After all,
most of the evidence he supplies has
been lying around ordinary collegiate
libraries for decades.
Our history has
had no equivalent to the Venona archival
revelations which in 1995 transformed
the study of European and
American Communism. Any clever
layman could have located nearly all
the primary sources that Windschuttle
provides. But it took Windschuttle to
make the effort, and, having made the
effort, to present his findings with lucid
finesse.
Hoary legend after hoary legend collapses
at the touch of Windschuttle’s
scythe. Take the oft-credited role of
Social Darwinist thinking in the Policy’s
origins. Were the Policy’s architects
and supporters really aflame with
enthusiasm for Social Darwinism?
Yes, they were, according to the muchread
Australian Race Relations by
Andrew Markus11 (and half-a-dozen
other comparably respected texts).
No, Windschuttle shows, they were
(mostly) not. “These authors [who
portray late-nineteenth-century Australian
culture as a Social Darwinist
paradise] have done nothing more
than comb through a very small sample
of reading matter, such as newspaper
editorials and contemporary
journal articles, and found three or
four phrases each, which appear to
express some of the terminology commonly
used by Social Darwinists. On
no better evidence than this, they have
then proclaimed the Australian colonies
awash with scientific racism.”12
Crucial to Windschuttle’s evidence is
the overwhelming extent to which
Australia — at the very time it is supposed
to have been inundated with
Social Darwinist ideas — managed to
continue as, dare one say it, a Christian
society. Leading Australian clerics
in this period, unlike their predominantly
invertebrate counterparts
in 2005, actually fought against their
foes rather than appeasing them:
whether these foes were Social Darwinist
or otherwise. Windschuttle reminds
us that when Social Darwinism
did attract an intellectual following
among Australians, it derived this following
as often as not from socialist
campaigners like Tom Mann. Since
Marx himself felt abject reverence not
only for Social Darwinism, but for
Darwinism — he sent Darwin a copy
of Das Kapital, inscribing it as being
from a “sincere admirer” — this should
occasion no astonishment.
Another fiction is similarly felled:
Australia as hotbed of genocidal hatred
towards Chinese. Windschuttle
shows that whatever anti-Chinese outbreaks
of violence occurred (“they are
nothing to be proud of, true, but it is
important to keep them in perspective
. . . the white men involved were a militant
minority”),13 racial aversion in itself
cannot have fuelled them. After all,
“there were plenty of Maoris and black
Americans on the goldfields, who
never attracted any animosity”. 14
What made the difference in the Chinese
case? Two factors primarily: the
sheer numbers of Chinese who started
congregating on the goldfields from
the late 1850s on, by which stage the
most profitable gold deposits had begun
to give out; and the absence,
among the Chinese themselves, of any
Western-style concepts concerning
the individual’s political freedom.
We can hardly blame this country’s
nascent labour movements for resenting
the presence, and the spectacular
augmentation within a few years, of
what amounted to a peon caste. Australian
pastoralists demonstrated during
the mid-nineteenth century — once the convict system had become
unsustainable — a voracious appetite
for hiring coolies; were these same
pastoralists so inherently virtuous and public-spirited that they could automatically
be trusted to forgo establishing
other forms of serfdom? To the
working classes it did not seem so.
Eighty years after the goldfields’ heyday
had ended, these classes’ sensitivity
to anything that would turn their
homeland into “a peasant country or
a gang labour country”15 made them
recoil with disgust from the doctrines
of B. A. Santamaria’s National Catholic
Rural Movement. (Whether they
should have recoiled with disgust is a
wholly different question; but they did
thus recoil, and this aspect of
Santamaria’s programme died a quick,
largely unnoticed death.)
Windschuttle’s tour de force is his
examination of the parliamentary debates
surrounding White Australia’s
legal implementation at a national
level. More outright tosh must have
been written about these debates than
about any other aspect of the Policy,
which is saying a vast amount. Like a
policeman who knows that solving a
crime involves tedious spadework
which cannot be delegated to others,
Windschuttle painstakingly pores over
Hansard and exhibits the most fantastical
discrepancies between what
the Rent-A-Mob Left quotes Federal
parliamentarians in the early twentieth
century as having said, and what
they actually said. Far from being – in
Reynolds’ meretricious words — “pervaded
with ideas of race and blood”
and “talk[ing] over and over about the
dangers of pollution and contamination”,
16 they mostly bent over backwards
to deny any biological animus
towards Asians.
They did so despite
the fact of having a genuine Yellow
Peril to fear: the seemingly irreversible
rise of Japanese expansionism,
which saw off Tsarist Russia’s armed
forces in 1904-05. (As a dizzying example
of the way that approval for the
Policy crossed ideological and, for that
matter, racial lines, we find suffragette
and anti-conscriptionist Adela
Pankhurst Walsh announcing in the
1930s: “the surest — indeed the only
— defence of our White Australia is
friendship with Japan.”17 )
Surprisingly, although he itemises
the specific racial appeal which the
White Australia Policy had for this
country’s (and the world’s) first socialist
Prime Minister, John Christian
Watson,18 Windschuttle fails — in his
investigation of White Australia’s zenith
— to stress one central point: the
fact that all nations of European stock (most famously the United States in
1924) adopted similar prohibitions to
Australia’s, in actuality if not always
in statutes, against non-white peoples.
Sometimes the Policy won support
even from those non-whites who, by
modern criteria of identity politics,
should have been most hysterical in
condemning it. Sir Garfield Barwick,
in extreme old age, recollected a meeting
he (as Foreign Minister) held with
Malaysia’s leader Tunku Abdul
Rahman during the mid-1960s: “I remember
the Tunku saying to me that
he understood Australia maintaining
a European population: ‘Why should
you have my insoluble problem? The
problem of ethnic diversity is insoluble.
I have Malays, Indians and Chinese
and it is insoluble’.” 19
Windschuttle makes no mention of
this. He likewise omits Menzies’ sorrow
at the de facto junking of the
Policy by Harold Holt. Menzies had
doggedly opposed the advice of Immigration
Minister and former cyclist Sir
Hubert Opperman that the Policy be
dropped;20 as late as December 1976
he called himself “[an] old-fashioned
White Australian”.21
In fact Windschuttle’s whole coverage
of the Policy’s desuetude could
well have been more elaborate. He
underrates (for instance) the Immigration
Reform Group, which exercised
so powerful a backstairs influence
as Menzies’ reign drew to a close.
Nevertheless he is careful to quote a
telling passage from the Australian
Catholic Bishops. While these bishops
took pains to censure “any false assumption
of racial superiority which
too often underlies the so-called White
Australia Policy”, they conceded
“merit in the economic argument
which has been used to justify this
policy.”22 This is hardly the zealous
endorsement of Grassbyite tribalism
which certain insufficiently educated
Sydney journalists have credited
preconciliar antipodean Catholic officialdom
with favouring.
Windschuttle does not believe that
the White Australia Policy can be reinstated;
nor, it is clear, would he consider
this reinstatement desirable even
if it became possible. Whether we can
now afford to eschew a Christian Australia
Policy, this reviewer takes leave
to doubt. Queen Isabella of Spain,
faced (as we are faced) with a mortal
threat to her country’s religious and military survival — a threat at least as
immediate as any menace that Islamic
terrorism holds for Australians these
days — could conceive of one longterm
remedy, and one alone, to the
problem: eject the infidel, or make him
convert. More than five hundred years
after the Queen’s reconquista, little if
anything can be added to this solution,
other than the monstrous and salutary
warning of present-day Islamicised
Holland. The fact that all advocacy of
national self-defence via sharp Christian
proselytism is now unpublishable,
even as a suggestion (not just in Australia’s
lowest-common-denominator
scandal-sheets, but in our notionally
“Right-wing” magazines), tells us a
great deal about the nature of our
worst current ethnic problem, about
our opinion-forming classes’ blithe
indifference to this problem, and
about such classes’ total incapacity to
solve it.
1. Keith Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy (Macleay Press, Sydney, 2004).
2. Henry Reynolds, North of Capricorn: The Untold Story of Australia’s North (Allen
& Unwin, Sydney, 2003), page 189.
3 . Humphrey McQueen, A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning Australian
Radicalism and Nationalism (Penguin Books, Melbourne, 1970), pages 50, 53.
4. Windschuttle, page 30.
5. Windschuttle, page 28.
6. Ashley Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (Columbia
University Press, New York, 1942), page 82.
7. Sir Julian Huxley: U.N.E.S.C.O.: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy (Public Affairs
Press, Washington D.C., 1947), page 60 [italicisation added by R.J.S.].
8. Among the diseases that attack specific ethnic groups: Tay-Sachs Disease, prevalent
among Ashkenazic Jews and no-one else; sickle-cell anaemia, the sufferers from
which are nearly all black; cystic fibrosis, the sufferers from which are nearly all white;
and macular degeneration, an incurable eye affliction disproportionately frequent
among white females (novelist Colleen McCullough is its best-known victim).
American Renaissance, February 2005. Fraser stoops to personal attacks on
Windschuttle’s candour: “He [Windschuttle] poses as a fearless foe of the academic
establishment, but his targets are often sitting ducks” (page 10). This is not the impression
formed by those who read Windschuttle’s work carefully.
10. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve (Free Press, New York,
1994); Michael Levin, Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean
(Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 1997); Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen,
IQ and the Wealth of Nations (Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 2002).
11. Andrew Markus, Australian Race Relations 1788-1993 (Allen & Unwin, Sydney,
1994), pages 14, 111.
12. Windschuttle, page 54.
13. Windschuttle, pages 170-171.
14. Windschuttle, page 167.Quarterly, March 1955, pp. 49-51; Windschuttle, pp. 160-161.
16. Reynolds, North of Capricorn, page 188.
17. Verna Coleman, Adela Pankhurst: The Wayward Suffragette, 1885-1961 (Melbourne
University Press, 1996), page 147.
18. Ross McMullin, So Monstrous A Travesty: Chris Watson and the World’s First
National Labour Government (Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2004), is — as
Windschuttle takes impish pleasure in observing — quaintly reticent on this theme.
19. Sir Garfield Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick’s Reflections and Recollections
(Federation Press, Sydney, 1995), page 181.
20. Michelle Grattan (ed.), Australian Prime Ministers (New Holland Publishers,
Sydney, 2000), page 201.
21. A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Vol. 2, 1944-1978 (Melbourne University
Press, 1999), page 564.
22. H. I. London, Non-White Immigration and the “White Australia” Policy (New
York University Press, 1970), pp. 121-122; Windschuttle, pages 330-331.
National Observer No. 64 - Autumn 2005